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Federal policymakers have invested substantial resources 
into turning around persistently low-performing schools, 
with the expectation that interventions would swiftly 
improve student achievement within 3 years (Herman et al., 
2008). However, research evaluating school turnaround 
reports mixed results (Dee, 2012; Dragoset et al., 2017; 
Zimmer et al., 2017). Since most of the existing research 
evaluates turnaround in the first few years of reform, results 
may be mixed because some reforms have immediate effects 
while others need longer to take hold. Longer term reforms 
align with the literature on earlier comprehensive school 
reform models, which find that school improvement efforts 
need more than 3 years to produce positive results (Aladjem 
et al., 2010; Berends et al., 2002; Bloom et al., 2001; 
Borman et al., 2003; Gross et al., 2009; Stuit, 2010).1 
Moreover, even if reforms do produce positive results early 
on, little is known about the sustainability of turnaround 
reforms. This article fills these gaps in the literature by 
examining both schools that have implemented turnaround 
reforms for multiple years and later cohorts that begin 
reforms after the turnaround models have matured.
Evidence from more mature turnaround initiatives is 
especially important under the current Every Student 
Succeeds Act (ESSA). Under ESSA, more states are design-
ing reforms that will operate for longer. For example, North 
Carolina’s ESSA plan gives its lowest-performing schools 
up to 12 years of school improvement supports (North 
Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 2018). In this 
article, we inform the sustainability of longer term ESSA 
reform models using updated data from 6 years of reform in 
Tennessee. These data allow us to contribute new evidence 
from one of the few turnaround initiatives across the country 
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that have been in continuous operation for longer than 3 
years (exceptions include Chin et al., 2019; Harris & Larsen, 
2016, 2019).2
We build on a 3-year evaluation by Zimmer et al. (2017) 
of Tennessee’s Achievement School District (ASD) and 
local Innovation Zones (iZones), both of which have oper-
ated multiple cohorts of schools. We further describe both 
models below, but note that the ASD relies on dramatic 
changes in school governance where chronically low-per-
forming schools are removed from local districts and 
restarted, mainly by charter management organizations. In 
contrast, local iZones place low-performing schools into 
intradistrict networks that are managed by dedicated district 
staff. Although the ASD and iZones have different gover-
nance structures, both models replaced teachers and princi-
pals in the first year of turnaround, and after 3 years, Zimmer 
et al. (2017) found that iZone schools produced significant 
positive student achievement effects while ASD schools 
produced null effects.
With novel data from a longer panel, we examine whether 
iZone schools have sustained positive effects and whether 
the ASD has produced positive results given more time. We 
estimate the ASD and iZone effects using difference-in-dif-
ferences (DID) models that compare ASD and iZone schools 
with similarly low-performing schools receiving no turn-
around interventions. We refer to these low-performing, 
nonturnaround schools as comparison schools and describe 
them further below. Averaging across all years and cohorts, 
we find that iZone reforms raised test score gains by approx-
imately 0.10 standard deviations (SD), which is similar in 
magnitude to the positive effects reported by Zimmer et al. 
(2017) and from reforms in Massachusetts (Papay & 
Hannon, 2018) and San Francisco (Sun et al., 2017). In con-
trast, ASD schools did not produce significant effects in any 
cohort, year, or subject.
In addition to student achievement, our study expands on 
Zimmer et al. (2017) by examining how ASD and iZone 
reforms affect student attendance and mobility, along with 
the turnover rate, effectiveness, and average experience of 
teachers and principals. Neither ASD nor iZone reforms sig-
nificantly affected student attendance or mobility; however, 
both models increased teacher and principal turnover in Year 
1, when staff replacement was intentional. After Year 1, 
ASD schools continued experiencing high teacher and prin-
cipal turnover, with lower performing and less-experienced 
replacements. Because of high-staff turnover, ASD schools 
may have had trouble maintaining a consistent improvement 
strategy, which helps explain the null ASD results. In con-
trast, after Year 1, staff turnover in iZone schools returned to 
levels similar to those in comparison schools. Moreover, the 
earlier and most successful iZone cohorts recruited effective 
teachers and principals, while the most recent and least suc-
cessful cohort was the only one to recruit less-effective 
teachers and less-experienced principals. Overall, we find a 
consistent relationship between the successful recruitment 
and retention of effective educators and positive effects on 
student achievement. In addition to reporting results, we dis-
cuss below potential reasons why ASD and iZone schools 
experienced differences in staff turnover.
Like Zimmer et al. (2017), most existing studies of turn-
around concentrate on the earlier years reform when inter-
ventions focus on addressing barriers to improvement. In 
this study, we instead examine later stages when reforms are 
focused on increasing capacity and sustaining improve-
ments. In doing so, we address three questions:
1. To what extent have iZone schools been able to sus-
tain positive effects?
2. Over a longer, 6-year period, do ASD schools pro-
duce positive effects on student achievement?
3. To what extent does either intervention affect student 
attendance and mobility along with the turnover rate, 
effectiveness, and experience of teachers and princi-
pals in turnaround schools?
School Turnaround in Tennessee
Tennessee’s current turnaround approach originated from 
the state’s 2010 First to the Top (FttT) legislation. The legis-
lation required Tennessee’s Department of Education 
(TDOE) to intervene in the state’s lowest-performing 5% of 
schools, called priority schools. Using FttT, Tennessee 
applied for and won approximately US$500 million of Race 
to the Top (RttT) funding to implement its proposed initia-
tives. Beginning in 2012–2013, priority schools were either 
placed into the ASD, joined an iZone, closed, or received no 
interventions.
Tennessee’s boldest turnaround model is the ASD, a 
statewide school district staffed by full-time TDOE person-
nel and led by a superintendent who reports directly to 
Tennessee’s Commissioner of Education. When chosen for 
the ASD, schools are removed from their local education 
agency (LEA) to be governed by TDOE, restarted under new 
management, and required to replace the principal and at 
least 50% of teachers. ASD schools were restarted under a 
charter management organization (CMO), except five that 
were directly managed by the ASD.3 The ASD relied on 
CMOs, because TDOE leaders believed freedom from 
bureaucratic oversight would give schools flexibility to 
focus on reforms, and previous research finds that some 
Tennessee charter schools out-performed the state average 
(Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2019). 
Notably, ASD schools are not schools of choice but continue 
to enroll students from their local catchment area.
As ASD operations were beginning in 2012, TDOE also 
approved the creation of local iZones in Shelby County 
Schools (Memphis) and Metro-Nashville Public Schools. 
Local iZones differ from the ASD primarily in that iZone 
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schools remain part of their LEA and are placed into an 
intradistrict network with other low-performing schools in 
the district. Local iZones are supported by full-time district 
employees and led by a director who reports to the superin-
tendent.4 Like the ASD, iZone schools must also replace the 
principal. Unlike the ASD, iZone schools are not required to 
replace teachers, though almost all iZone schools did replace 
at least 50% of teachers on joining an iZone. Then, after ini-
tial staff replacements, the iZones had broad autonomy to 
manage their daily operations. Since 2012, two additional 
districts have opened iZones: Hamilton County Schools and 
Knox County Schools. In this article, we pool all four iZones 
together, but our conclusions do not change when we exam-
ine only the Memphis iZone, where the vast majority of pri-
ority schools are located.5
During its first 3 years, the ASD was funded by part of 
Tennessee’s RttT grant and with philanthropic support. 
When RttT funds were depleted, TDOE continued funding 
the ASD from its budget. When iZones were created, dis-
tricts received School Improvement Grant (SIG) funding 
from TDOE to support all iZone schools. When SIG funding 
ended, districts used a combination of philanthropic support, 
state funds, and portions of their own budget to continue 
funding current schools and any new schools joining their 
iZones. Notably, iZone schools used their funding for per-
formance pay incentives to recruit and retain effective teach-
ers. Both the ASD and iZones have continued receiving 
funding and support, differentiating this article from studies 
that examine turnaround effects after the active reforms have 
ended. Furthermore, ongoing funding as part of the TDOE 
and district budgets show that these models have moved 
toward building capacity and sustaining the reforms.
Some priority schools not placed into either the ASD or 
an iZone were closed, and our communications with district 
leaders indicate that priority schools were only closed if they 
had very low enrollment. Closed schools remain part of our 
sample in the years they are open.6 Besides the priority des-
ignation itself, priority schools not taken over by the ASD, 
placed into an iZone, or closed did not receive any other 
funding or interventions from the state or their LEAs.
ASD schools were chosen from the priority list based on 
school feeder patterns and whether a CMO could be matched 
with the school (Tennessee Department of Education, 2012). 
The matching process allowed CMOs to present their pro-
posed reform plan to a committee of ASD leaders and local 
stakeholders (i.e., parents and community leaders). Under its 
feeder pattern approach, the ASD began taking over elemen-
tary schools in its first cohort and would later target middle 
and high schools receiving students from these ASD elemen-
tary schools. The Memphis iZone similarly used feeder pat-
terns to choose schools, whereas all priority schools not 
placed into the ASD or closed in Nashville, Hamilton 
County, and Knox County were assigned to their respective 
iZones. Although these practices loosely guided which 
schools would join the ASD and iZones, our communica-
tions with state and district leaders suggest that the process 
was not systematic and often rushed because of political 
pressure to quickly intervene in priority schools. These pres-
sures suggest that schools were not systematically chosen 
for turnaround because of their performance levels or poten-
tial for future growth. To mitigate concerns that schools 
were systematically chosen, we examine baseline character-
istics and test score trends of ASD and iZone schools rela-
tive to comparison schools and found them to be highly 
similar.7
After Tennessee released an initial list of 83 priority 
schools in 2012, both the ASD and iZones began operating 
schools chosen from this list.8 In Table 1, we show the num-
ber of schools in each ASD and iZone cohort. Across the 6 
years of turnaround examined in this article (2012–2013 
through 2017–2018), five cohorts joined the ASD or an 
iZone, with no additional schools joining either model in 
2017–2018. Beginning in 2012–2013, the first cohort 
includes six ASD, 13 iZone, and one school that was closed, 
leaving 65 priority schools that received no interventions. 
The second cohort was chosen from these remaining 65 
TABLE 1
Number of Schools by Reform Approach and Cohort
Cohort No. First year of turnaround reforms Non-iZone, non-ASD priority schools ASD schools iZone schools Closed
Cohort 1 2012–2013 65 6 13a 1
Cohort 2 2013–2014 45 6 11 3
Cohort 3 2014–2015 59b 5 4 8
Cohort 4 2015–2016 40 5 11c 3
Cohort 5 2016–2017 26 4 3 7
Note. ASD = Achievement School District; iZones = Innovation Zones.
aTwo schools were placed into the Nashville iZone in 2012–2013 even though they were not on the 2012 priority list. These two schools are on the 2014 
priority list. bThe number of priority schools increases in 2014–2015, because Tennessee released a new list of priority schools in 2014. cTwo schools in the 
fourth iZone cohort were closed in the following year. During this time period, the ASD opened new-start schools that did not exist previously and were not 
named a priority school by Tennessee on its 2012 or 2014 priority list. Also, in these years, the ASD began operating in untested grades in some priority 
schools. New start schools and schools where the ASD had not yet began operating tested grades were not included in this analysis.
Pham et al.
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priority schools to begin reforms in 2013–2014. The second 
cohort includes six ASD, 11 iZone, and three schools that 
were closed, leaving 45 priority schools that had not received 
any reforms by 2013–2014. New schools continued joining 
the ASD and iZones in Cohorts 3, 4, and 5, resulting in a 
total 26 ASD, 42 iZone, and 26 priority schools that have not 
received any turnaround interventions by 2017–2018. We 
show below that student characteristics are very similar in 
each of the five ASD and iZone cohorts, suggesting that dif-
ferent results across cohorts are not driven by changes in the 
types of schools being taken over.
Additional priority schools were identified in 2014 when 
Tennessee released a second priority list with 33 schools that 
were not on the 2012 list.9 Our comparison sample includes 
all nonturnaround schools on either the 2012 or 2014 prior-
ity list, but results are similar when we use only schools on 
one of the two lists (Appendix Table A3). Priority school 
designation can itself be considered an intervention because 
being labeled a low-performing school could motivate 
schools to demonstrate improvement, but all schools in our 
sample are priority schools. Thus, our analysis compares pri-
ority schools receiving one of two turnaround interventions 
with priority schools receiving no interventions. Finally, 
note that during this time period, no schools exited either the 
ASD or iZones.
Review of the Whole-School Reform Literature
Whole-school reforms have received substantial policy 
interest and investment, especially through federal initia-
tives including Project Follow Through (Egbert, 1981), New 
American Schools (Berends et al., 2002), Comprehensive 
School Reform (Aladjem et al., 2010), School Improvement 
Grants (Dragoset et al., 2017), Race to the Top (Heissel & 
Ladd, 2018; Henry et al., 2015), and NCLB (No Child Left 
Behind) waivers under the Obama administration (Bonilla & 
Dee, 2017; Dee & Dizon-Ross, 2017; Dougherty & Weiner, 
2019; Hemelt & Jacob, 2017). Though specific interventions 
varied, these reform initiatives share the idea that incremen-
tal interventions are insufficient and that low-performing 
schools do not have individual capacity to improve. Under 
ESSA, the approach to whole-school reform is transitioning 
to flexible, state-formulated plans, and this flexibility sug-
gests that states will need guidance on how to shape their 
reform plans in light of prior whole-school reform initia-
tives. However, evaluations accompanying these reform ini-
tiatives report mixed results (e.g., Dragoset et al., 2017), so 
to better understand the literature, we turn to the underlying 
theory of action for turnaround.
Broadly called “turnaround,” the most recent national 
efforts to improve low-performing schools have been primar-
ily shaped by four models prescribed under the federal SIG 
program: transformation, turnaround, restart, and closure 
(Perlman & Redding, 2011). Local iZones in Tennessee 
implemented reforms aligned with the transformation model: 
requiring schools to replace principals but not teachers. The 
ASD implemented the restart model by closing and reopen-
ing schools under new management. These reform initiatives 
share a theory of action with three stages: (1) disrupt barriers 
to improvement (Herman et al., 2008); (2) build an improve-
ment infrastructure (Peurach & Neumerski, 2015); and (3) 
sustain the momentum (Copland, 2003; Kutash et al., 2010). 
This three-stage theory of action suggests that schools may 
need time to reestablish stable operations after initial, disrup-
tive reforms and raises questions about sustainability.
Most existing research examines the first 3 years of turn-
around (i.e., the disruption stage). These studies describe 
interventions that focus on building human capacity by 
recruiting effective teachers and leaders (Carlson & Lavertu, 
2018; Kho et al., 2018), and some evaluations find larger 
positive results in schools that successfully recruit new 
teachers and principals relative to schools that do not bring 
in new staff (Anrig, 2015; Carlson & Lavertu, 2018; Dee, 
2012; Strunk et al., 2016). These lessons are valuable, but 
the disruption stage is a tenuous time to evaluate reforms, 
because interventions can create rapid changes that may 
detract from potential positive effects.
In the second, infrastructure-building stage, researchers 
assert that successful reforms should focus on retaining 
effective staff because turnover could force principals to hire 
less-experienced or less-effective teachers (Calkins et al., 
2007). Similarly, in-service development initiatives can be 
thwarted by turnover because teachers and leaders take 
newly gained skills with them when they leave (Henry & 
Harbatkin, 2018). Besides staff turnover, researchers also 
emphasize student attendance and mobility, because improv-
ing school operations means little when students are not in 
school (Dougherty & Weiner, 2019). These existing studies 
suggest that student attendance, student mobility, and staff 
retention help illuminate the reform process, but there is 
insufficient research documenting how ongoing reforms 
affect these student and staff characteristics.
Even fewer studies examine turnaround in the third stage, 
as reformers work to sustain the model. One model that has 
persisted is the portfolio district in New Orleans. Research in 
New Orleans suggests the model faced new challenges over 
time (Harris & Larsen, 2016, 2019; McEachin et al., 2016; 
Ruble, 2015), such as a shrinking pool of effective teachers 
and leaders available to transfer into turnaround schools. In 
New Orleans, efforts to sustain the model included recruit-
ing charter operators and partnering with alternative certifi-
cation programs like Teach for America and TeachNOLA 
(Harris & Larsen, 2016, 2019). However, even in New 
Orleans, there is little evidence on whether schools continue 
to successfully recruit and retain effective staff as the model 
expands over time. We help fill these gaps in the literature by 
examining the ASD and iZones as they mature into the 
capacity-building and sustaining stages.
Sustainability and Maturation of School Turnaround
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Method
Data
Data are provided by TDOE and managed by the 
Tennessee Education Research Alliance. The administrative 
data sets capture characteristics of students, teachers, and 
principals for all Tennessee public schools. The student data 
sets contain a rich set of characteristics including gender, 
race, eligibility for free or reduced-price meals (FRPM), 
English language learner status (ELL), and special education 
status (SpED). Teacher and principal characteristics include 
gender, race, and degree attainment. Our analytic sample 
consists of students in tested subjects and grades, and we 
restrict the analysis to only priority schools. This leaves a 
sample of 315,663 student-year-subject observations with 
nonmissing covariates, with unique records for 63,419 stu-
dents, 9,300 teachers, 311 principals, and 116 schools.
Measures
Our primary outcome of interest is student test scores. 
In Tennessee, students take end-of-grade exams in Grades 
3 to 8 and end-of-course exams in high school subjects. 
Because of testing complications that occurred during the 
transition to new assessments in 2015–2016, EOG scores 
in Grades 3 to 8 were not reported for any Tennessee 
school; therefore, our analysis does not include any scores 
from 2015 to 2016.10 To have a common metric across 
years, we standardize the scale scores by subject, grade, 
year, and for the EOCs, semester.
Based on our literature review, we also examine effects 
on student mobility and attendance, along with turnover, 
effectiveness, and experience of teachers and leaders. By 
linking students and educators with schools in each year, we 
create student mobility and staff turnover measures by gen-
erating indicators that equal one when the student or educa-
tor is observed in a school that is different from her school in 
the prior year. These new-to-school indicators are begin-
ning-of-year turnover measures. We test whether our results 
are robust when using an alternative, end-of-year turnover 
indicator for whether the student or educator is no longer in 
her current school in the following year. Consistent with 
existing literature, we reach similar conclusions when using 
this alternative mobility measure (Ronfeldt et al., 2013).
For students, attendance is the proportion of school days 
attended, and the mobility indicator captures whether the 
student is new to her school due to a nonstructural move.11 
For teachers, we examine three outcomes: turnover, years of 
experience, and prior year value-added scores for incoming 
teachers. In Tennessee, teachers in tested grades and subjects 
receive a value-added score on the Tennessee value-added 
assessment system (TVAAS) ranging from one to five. We 
use the TVAAS score to measure teacher effectiveness in the 
year before they enter an ASD or iZone school.
For principals, we use parallel measures that include prin-
cipal turnover, observation scores, and years of principal 
experience. The principal observation scores range from one 
to five and are annual supervisor ratings given to school 
leaders using a rubric based on the Tennessee Instructional 
Leadership Standards or TILS (Grissom et al., 2018). Scores 
on the TILS rubric are given by the district superintendent or 
her designee (usually the principal’s supervisor).12 Grissom 
et al. (2018) find that principals’ observation scores are 
internally consistent, stable over time, and predictive of 
other performance measures, such as student achievement 
growth and teachers’ ratings of their school leadership.
Analytic Strategy
We use DID models that examine student outcomes (test 
scores, mobility, and attendance) and teacher and principal 
outcomes (turnover, effectiveness, and experience). We 
examine each outcome, y, for individual i in grade g, school 
s, and year t:
y After ASD After
iZone After
igst gst s gst
s gst
= + +
+ +
β β β
β
0 1 2
3
( * )
( * ) ′
+ ′ + +
Xigst
stD
δ
π ds igstε
 (1)
Equation 1 models y as a function of After, an indicator for 
years after turnaround begins, and interactions between 
After and indicators for schools that are ever ASD or iZone.13 
The model also includes ′Xigst , a vector of individual control 
variables. For student-level outcomes, these individual con-
trols include indicators for gender, race, FRPM, ELL, and 
SpED.14 For teacher and principal outcomes, individual con-
trol variables include indicators for gender, race, and gradu-
ate degree attainment.15 We include these individual control 
variables to mitigate any concerns that our results are driven 
by changes in student, teacher, or principal characteristics, 
but our results are not sensitive to their inclusion (Appendix 
Table A4).
Equation 1 also includes a school fixed effect (ds) and 
time-varying school compositional characteristics ( ′Dst). The 
school fixed effect controls for unobserved, time-invariant 
school characteristics that are associated with both turn-
around and each outcome. Also, we include ′Dst  to control 
for compositional characteristics that change over time, 
including student level covariates aggregated to the school 
level: gender, race, FRPM, ELL, and SpED.16 We follow 
standard practice in existing literature by controlling for 
these characteristics to ensure that our results are not driven 
by changes in the students enrolled in either ASD or iZone 
schools. Changes in student composition during the inter-
vention period could mask or induce spurious effects unless 
controlled in the models. However, to rule out endogenous 
changes in composition, we provide estimates without 
Pham et al.
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including these covariates in Appendix Table A4. All stan-
dard errors are clustered at the school-level to account for 
nonindependence between students within the same school.
When modeling test scores, we make several adjust-
ments to Equation 1. First, we not only estimate Equation 1 
for each subject (reading, math, and science) separately but 
also use a pooled sample of all subjects where we add sub-
ject indicators to control for any systematic variation 
between the three subjects. Second, we add a control for 
students’ prior-year test score. We control for the prior-year 
achievement lag as our preferred model to facilitate com-
parisons with existing literature which primarily uses the 
prior-year lag. However, researchers have questioned the 
prior-year lag in this type of longitudinal model, arguing it 
may underestimate treatment effects because it adjusts for 
a score that may already be affected by turnaround (Sun 
et al., 2017). Therefore, we test two alternatives. First, we 
replace the prior-year lag with the average for each school-
by-grade combination in all years prior to turnaround (i.e., 
a school-by-grade baseline lag). This alternative lag 
accounts for preintervention differences at the school-by-
grade level, without controlling for scores that have been 
influenced by turnaround. We also replace the prior year 
test score with the average for each student in all years 
prior to attending a turnaround school (i.e., a student base-
line lag). Models that use either the school-by-grade or stu-
dent baseline lag lead to similar conclusions as our 
preferred prior-year lag (Appendix Table A5). Finally, for 
test scores outcomes, we add a grade fixed effect to ensure 
that results are not driven by unobserved differences across 
grades but excluding the grade fixed effect yields similar 
results (Appendix Table A4).
The coefficients of interest in Equation 1 are β
2
 and β
3
 
for the ASD and iZones, respectively. The coefficients are 
interpreted as the pre–post turnaround difference for ASD 
or iZone schools minus the same pre–post difference for 
comparison schools. Equation 1 estimates the effects of 
ASD and iZone interventions under the identifying assump-
tion that, conditional on covariates, comparison schools are 
a reasonable counterfactual for how ASD or iZone schools 
would have fared had they not begun turnaround. Below, 
we present validity and robustness checks to support this 
assumption.
To examine the ASD and iZone effects across time, we 
estimate event-study models that substitute the After vari-
able with a set of six indicators for each year after schools 
begin turnaround. Interacting these six indicators with the 
ever-ASD and ever-iZone indicators allows us to estimate 
the cumulative effect of turnaround reforms in each year 
after schools join either model. Note that each cohort has a 
different number of years as part of a turnaround “treat-
ment.” For example, the first cohort of ASD or iZone schools 
will have experienced six years of turnaround reforms 
between 2012–2013 and 2017–2018, and the second cohort 
will have experienced 5 years of reforms between 2013–
2014 and 2017–2018. For comparison schools, we center the 
After indicators on the year when they are designated as pri-
ority that is either 2012 or 2014. Despite missing test scores 
in 2015–2016, indicators for each postturnaround year allow 
us to estimate results for the fourth year of turnaround 
because Year 4 is 2016–2017 for cohort two and 2017–2018 
for cohort three.
Finally, in a third specification, we separate the indicators 
for ever-ASD or ever-iZone into each of the five ASD and 
iZone cohorts. Interacting these cohort indicators with After 
yields effects for each cohort.17 When using the student 
mobility, teacher turnover, and principal turnover indicators 
as outcomes, our results are estimated using linear probabil-
ity models. We present results from the linear probability 
models to ease interpretation, but estimates from logistic 
regression yield similar conclusions.
Below we also describe multiple robustness checks to 
rule out potential validity threats. For example, we test 
whether comparison schools are a valid counterfactual by 
examining whether test score trends in ASD, iZone, and 
comparison schools are parallel in the preturnaround period. 
We also examine whether effects are driven by changes in 
student characteristics in these turnaround schools using a 
student fixed model to control for time-invariant student 
characteristics. Additionally, we test our models using an 
alternative comparison group and also examine whether our 
results are driven by mean reversion from potential dips in 
student performance prior to turnaround. Our checks pro-
vide evidence that our results are robust to alternative 
explanations.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
In Table 2, we present descriptive characteristics of stu-
dents, teachers, and principals, showing that priority schools 
differ from nonpriority schools both before and after turn-
around. Relative to nonpriority schools, priority schools 
tend to serve a larger population of Black students (87%–
94%), FRPM eligible students (83%–92%), and students 
new to their school (28%–33%). Table 2 also shows that stu-
dent characteristics are similar between ASD, iZone, and 
comparison schools before reforms began. When comparing 
baseline school characteristics before turnaround, we find 
only one significant difference in the proportion of minority 
students between iZone and comparison schools, but the 
magnitude of the difference (2 percentage points) is substan-
tively small (Appendix Table A2). Moreover, turnaround 
reforms do not significantly change school compositional 
characteristics, suggesting that ASD or iZone effects are not 
driven by changes to the student population in these schools 
(Appendix Table A12).18
7
Table 2 also shows characteristics of teachers and princi-
pals in ASD and iZone schools. In ASD schools, both teacher 
and principal turnover increase after reforms begin. For 
example, the average proportion of new-to-school teachers 
rises from 24% to 51% after schools join the ASD. Part of 
this increased turnover is expected given staff replacement 
interventions in Year 1. However, increases in staff turnover 
are much less dramatic for iZone schools than ASD schools 
even though both models replaced teachers and principals in 
Year 1, suggesting that iZone schools were more successful 
at retaining teachers after the first year of intentional staff 
replacements.
There are also differences in the types of teachers and 
principals recruited to ASD and iZone schools. After schools 
join the ASD, teachers are more likely to be White (increas-
ing from 28% to 40%), have fewer years of experience 
(decreasing from 12 to 5.2 years), and are less likely to hold 
a graduate degree (decreasing from 67% to 56%). Average 
teacher experience also decreases after schools join an iZone 
(from 11 to 8.7 years). However, the decrease in teacher 
experience in iZone schools is smaller than in ASD schools, 
and average teacher TVAAS scores are noticeably higher 
after schools join an iZone, rising from an average of 2.5 to 
3.1 out of 5. These trends in teacher experience and effec-
tiveness are mirrored among principals. Additionally, we 
examine descriptive characteristics for each ASD and iZone 
cohort to better understand the types of schools chosen for 
either model over time. Appendix Table A6 shows that 
TABLE 2
Descriptive Characteristics of ASD Schools; iZone Schools; Non-ASD, Non-iZone Priority Schools; and All Other, Nonpriority Schools 
in Tennessee
Characteristic
ASD iZone
Non-ASD, non-iZone 
priority schools
All other, nonpriority 
schools
Before After Before After Before After Before After
Student characteristics
 Female .5 .48 .5 .48 .5 .5 .5 .49
 Black .92 .93 .87 .87 .94 .89 .2 .21
 Hispanic .057 .049 .066 .082 .048 .054 .06 .085
 Asian .0043 .0035 .0061 .0052 .003 .0032 .018 .021
 White .02 .019 .057 .044 .0078 .012 .72 .68
 FRPM .92 .83 .89 .89 .87 .86 .51 .5
 ELL .026 .032 .033 .049 .025 .045 .02 .029
 SpED .12 .14 .12 .15 .1 .12 .081 .12
 Attendance rate .94 .92 .93 .92 .94 .93 .95 .95
 Proportion new to school .33 .31 .28 .29 .31 .31 .15 .15
Teacher characteristics
 Female .79 .82 .77 .78 .76 .77 .79 .78
 Black .71 .58 .54 .59 .68 .65 .1 .11
 White .28 .4 .45 .4 .32 .34 .89 .88
 Proportion new to school .24 .51 .29 .36 .27 .29 .17 .18
 TVAAS Score (1–5) 2.5 2.7 2.5 3.1 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.2
 Years of experience 12 5.2 11 8.7 11 10 13 12
 Master’s degree or higher .67 .56 .63 .65 .6 .65 .59 .61
Principal characteristics
 Female .65 .8 .56 .6 .64 .56 .55 .57
 Black .93 .67 .68 .76 .84 .86 .14 .15
 White .069 .33 .31 .23 .16 .14 .86 .84
 Proportion new to school .25 .67 .36 .42 .34 .33 .22 .25
 Observation score (1–5) 3.5 3.1 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.9
 Years of experience 5.4 2.1 5 4.2 3.9 4.2 5.8 6.2
 Master’s degree or higher 1 .76 1 .99 .92 .93 .98 .98
Note. Attendance rate is the proportion of school days attended. The proportion of students new to a school do not include students who make structural 
moves. Principal years of experience only includes the years in which the individual was a principal, not all years of experience as an educator. The teacher 
TVAAS and principal observation scores range from 1 (significantly below expectations) to 5 (significantly above expectations). ASD = Achievement 
School District; iZone = Innovation Zone; FRPM = eligibility for free or reduced-priced meals; ELL = English language learner; SpED = special education 
status; TVAAS = Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System.
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student characteristics are similar in each of the five ASD 
and iZone cohorts, suggesting that different outcomes across 
cohorts are not likely driven by changes in the types of 
schools chosen for turnaround.
Before turning to the DID results, Figure 1 shows descrip-
tive trends in standardized test scores, averaged across all 
three subjects, for ASD, iZone, and comparison schools. The 
trends are shown across a year variable centered at zero on 
the baseline year before turnaround. For comparison schools, 
Year 0 is the year before their priority designation. The fig-
ure shows that, prior to turnaround, student achievement is 
slightly lower in ASD and iZone schools relative to compari-
son schools; however, the trends in student achievement are 
qualitatively similar with no sharp spikes in either ASD or 
iZone schools that differ from comparison schools. 
Moreover, no crossovers exist between turnaround and com-
parison schools prior to reforms. Student test scores in all 
schools exhibit some declines in the years before turnaround, 
but these downward trends are similar in ASD, iZone, and 
comparison schools. This figure provides descriptive evi-
dence that student achievement trends in comparison schools 
provide a valid counterfactual for what would have occurred 
in turnaround schools had they not joined either the ASD or 
an iZone. To provide further evidence supporting the parallel 
trends assumption, we estimate a model that includes sepa-
rate indicators for each year in our panel and interact them 
with the ASD and iZone indicators. This model examines 
student achievement in each preturnaround year relative to 
the baseline year before turnaround (Appendix Table A7). 
Results show no significant difference in student achieve-
ment between either turnaround model and comparison 
schools in any preturnaround year. Moreover, joint F tests of 
all preturnaround years show no evidence of significant dif-
ferences prior to turnaround.
Figure 1 also shows average standardized student 
achievement results after turnaround reforms are imple-
mented, suggesting that test scores increase in all schools. 
Increases in all schools indicate that the priority designation 
alone may have spurred some improvements in these 
schools, because comparison schools received no other 
interventions. However, although all comparison schools 
show improvement, the increase in iZone schools surpasses 
comparison schools in the first 2 years. Then, the iZone 
gains diminish after Year 2, but they do not completely van-
ish, and average iZone scores remain higher than in the 
ASD. In contrast, test scores in ASD schools increase some-
what in the first 3 years, then decrease again, never catching 
up to either iZone or comparison schools and, by Year 6, 
average test scores in ASD schools are slightly lower than in 
any preturnaround year.
DID Results
Turning to the DID results, Table 3 shows average ASD 
and iZone effects on standardized test scores averaged across 
all years and cohorts for all subjects and each subject (read-
ing, math, and science). The table also shows separate mod-
els including either the prior-year lag or the school-by-grade 
baseline lag. Consistent with previous literature, we find that 
including the baseline lag yields somewhat larger effects 
than the prior-year lag, because turnaround reforms may 
have affected the prior-year lag. However, we prefer the 
prior-year lag, because students’ most recent previous per-
formance best accounts for unobserved factors that affect 
their current performance. Therefore, our preferred models 
should be interpreted as somewhat conservative. Hereafter, 
we focus on models using the prior-year lag; estimates using 
the baseline lag are available on request.
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FIGURE 1. Average student test scores in each year before and after turnaround interventions began.
Note. Years are centered such that zero is the year before school turnaround interventions began for ASD and iZone schools. For comparison schools, Year 
0 is the year before these schools are designated as priority schools.
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Table 3 shows that the average iZone effect is positive 
and statistically significant. Using a prior-year lag, the iZone 
effect is approximately 0.10 SD, which holds across subjects 
(though the coefficient is marginally significant for reading, 
p =0.06). Similar to previous school evaluation studies, our 
estimates are somewhat larger in math (0.10 SD) than in 
reading (0.06 SD). The effect estimate is largest in science 
(0.15 SD). Since science test scores are not part of Tennessee’s 
school accountability system, large gains in science suggest 
that positive iZone effects are not driven by a narrowed 
focus on subject-specific test preparation. For ASD schools, 
the coefficients are substantively small and statistically 
insignificant in all subjects.
To examine effects over time, Table 4 shows estimates 
from our event-study model. In ASD schools, we find no 
significant effects in any year or subject. In iZone schools, 
we find positive and significant effects concentrated in the 
first 2 years. For example, the cumulative effect of iZone 
reforms after 2 years is 0.15 SD. Positive effects of iZone 
reforms in the first 2 years are similar across reading, math, 
and science, except the estimate for reading in Year 2 is 
marginally significant (p =0.06). However, the positive 
iZone effects diminish and become statistically insignifi-
cant in Years 3 and 4, suggesting that early gains were not 
sustained in these years. Then, for Years 5 and 6, the esti-
mates for iZone schools increase but are not statistically 
significant, except the 6th-year estimate in reading (0.13 
SD). The pattern across multiple years suggest that moder-
ate to large positive effects of iZone interventions diminish 
after the first 2 years, but the coefficients in Years 5 and 6 
are suggestive of potential positive effects, which may be 
insignificant due to low statistical power. There is less 
power to detect significant effects in Years 5 and 6, because 
only the first two iZone cohorts have received 5 years of 
reforms, and only the first cohort has undergone 6 years of 
reforms.
Table 5 examines separate effects for each cohort. For 
ASD schools, again we find no evidence of positive 
effects and even observe a 0.08 SD decrease in Cohort 2, 
driven mostly by math scores. For iZones, the overall 
positive effect is driven by the first two cohorts. The sec-
ond and third cohorts produce mostly null effects, except 
a positive effect of 0.13 SD in science in Cohort 3. Finally, 
averaging all subjects, we find noticeable negative effects 
in the fifth iZone cohort of about 0.19 SD. These negative 
results are driven by scores in reading and math. Below, 
we discuss potential reasons for negative effects in the 
fifth iZone cohort.
Adding to our examination of test scores, Table 6 exam-
ines additional outcomes for students, teachers, and princi-
pals. We find that ASD and iZone reforms do not have a 
significant effect on student attendance or mobility, but 
teachers have a 23% increase in the probability of being new 
to the school after schools join the ASD. Part of the increased 
teacher turnover is explained by intentional staff replace-
ments in Year 1, but below, we show that teacher turnover in 
the ASD continued to be high after Year 1. The coefficient 
for teacher turnover in iZone schools is not statistically sig-
nificant. When we examine the effectiveness of incoming 
teachers, the coefficient is not significant for either model. 
TABLE 3
ASD and iZone Effects on Standardized Test Scores Averaged Across All Years and Cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Subjects All Subjects Reading Reading Math Math Science Science
ASD .0011 
(.044)
.0022 
(.031)
.03 
(.047)
.0088 
(.032)
−.015 
(.054)
−.0095 
(.044)
−.011 
(.055)
.013 
(.043)
iZone .13** 
(.047)
.096** 
(.035)
.12** 
(.044)
.055 
(.029)
.12* 
(.051)
.096* 
(.043)
.18** 
(.063)
.15** 
(.047)
School-by-grade baseline lag .41*** 
(.037)
.25*** 
(.05)
.31*** 
(.056)
.3*** 
(.063)
 
Prior-year lag .62*** 
(.0043)
.67*** 
(.0041)
.57*** 
(.0082)
.61*** 
(.005)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Observations 455,209 315,663 163,479 11,4299 153,253 105,023 138,477 96,341
Adjusted R2 .110 .416 .127 .478 .094 .369 .108 .403
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD and iZone represent the interaction between indicators for schools that are ever-ASD or ever-iZone and an indicator 
for years after schools begin turnaround. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 
2014 priority list. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Moreover, ASD teachers have fewer years of experience 
(4.9 fewer years than comparison school teachers) compared 
with iZone teachers (1.5 fewer years than comparison school 
teachers).
ASD principals have a 47% greater probability of 
being new to their school compared with comparison 
school principals. Similar to teachers, part of the elevated 
principal turnover in the ASD occurs because of man-
dated replacement policies in Year 1, but principal turn-
over remains high after the first year (Appendix Table 
A8). Average principal observation scores do not change 
significantly in either ASD or iZone schools, but average 
principal experience decreases in ASD schools (about 3.4 
years).
To conserve space, effect estimates for these student, 
teacher, and principal outcomes separated by year are in 
Appendix Table A8, but we note that ASD schools experi-
ence elevated teacher and principal turnover across the 6 
years, whereas teacher turnover increases only in Year 1 for 
the iZones. To provide more context for ASD and iZone 
effects across cohorts, Table 7 shows all outcomes separated 
by cohort. Again, there is little evidence that either ASD or 
TABLE 4
ASD and iZones Effects on Test Scores by Turnaround Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Subjects Reading Math Science
ASD
 ASD Year 1 −.037 
(.064)
.017 
(.046)
−.1 
(.11)
−.033 
(.097)
 ASD Year 2 .023 
(.056)
.015 
(.046)
.074 
(.069)
−.026 
(.081)
 ASD Year 3 .017 
(.051)
.02 
(.037)
−.015 
(.078)
.064 
(.073)
 ASD Year 4 −.056 
(.055)
−.044 
(.058)
−.07 
(.073)
−.095 
(.096)
 ASD Year 5 −.04 
(.092)
−.038 
(.054)
−.14 
(.1)
−.0022 
(.22)
 ASD Year 6 −.084 
(.1)
−.056 
(.082)
−.14 
(.09)
−.097 
(.17)
iZone
 iZone Year 1 .11* 
(.042)
.068* 
(.033)
.13* 
(.051)
.15* 
(.064)
 iZone Year 2 .15** 
(.044)
.071 
(.038)
.21*** 
(.056)
.18** 
(.06)
 iZone Year 3 .027 
(.045)
.013 
(.043)
−.035 
(.061)
.12 
(.062)
 iZone Year 4 −.059 
(.1)
−.087 
(.094)
−.15 
(.15)
.092 
(.095)
 iZone Year 5 .11 
(.07)
.1 
(.054)
.051 
(.082)
.097 
(.11)
 iZone Year 6 .14 
(.07)
.13** 
(.044)
.16 
(.085)
.11 
(.1)
 Prior year lag .62*** 
(.0043)
.67*** 
(.0042)
.57*** 
(.0082)
.61*** 
(.0049)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116
Observations 315,663 114,299 105,023 96,341
Adjusted R2 .417 .479 .373 .404
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 
priority list. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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iZone schools have significant effects on student attendance 
or mobility, except students in the third ASD cohort have a 
lower probability of being new to their school, and the fifth 
ASD cohort has lower attendance rates.
Table 7 shows that the probability of a teacher being new 
to her school is increased in every ASD cohort (20%–38%), 
though the effect is marginally significant in cohort four. 
Likewise, the probability of a principal being new to her 
school is positive and significant in every ASD cohort 
(36%–70%). Moreover, average teacher and principal expe-
rience is lower than in comparison schools for every ASD 
cohort.
For iZones, the probability that a teacher is new to her 
school is also positive (8–15 percentage points) but smaller 
in magnitude than in ASD schools. The effect of iZone 
reforms on teacher turnover is highest in Cohort 5 (15%). 
Besides teacher turnover, the fifth iZone cohort differs in 
other ways from the first four cohorts. Only in the fifth 
cohort do we observe a negative effect on prior-year TVAAS 
scores among incoming teachers, suggesting that the fifth 
iZone cohort is recruiting less-effective teachers than com-
parison schools. Moreover, the probability that a principal is 
new to her school is only significant in Cohort 5, and only in 
the fifth cohort do we find a negative effect on principal 
experience in iZone schools. Together, these results show 
that the fifth iZone cohort experienced higher staff turnover 
with incoming teachers who are less effective and principals 
who are less experienced.
TABLE 5
ASD and iZone Effects on Test Scores by Cohort
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Subjects Reading Math Science
ASD
 ASD Cohort 1 .043 
(.052)
.008 
(.052)
.023 
(.063)
.092 
(.068)
 ASD Cohort 2 −.082* 
(.041)
−.03 
(.041)
−.16** 
(.053)
−.07 
(.063)
 ASD Cohort 3 .0058 
(.046)
.044 
(.052)
.058 
(.072)
−.075 
(.088)
 ASD Cohort 4 .055 
(.045)
.026 
(.031)
.11 
(.085)
.028 
(.049)
 ASD Cohort 5 −.04 
(.065)
−.06 
(.033)
−.075 
(.1)
.036 
(.074)
iZone
 iZone Cohort 1 .16*** 
(.046)
.11** 
(.04)
.19*** 
(.051)
.19** 
(.064)
 iZone Cohort 2 .15** 
(.055)
.13** 
(.04)
.16** 
(.055)
.18* 
(.079)
 iZone Cohort 3 −.0021 
(.033)
.0041 
(.025)
−.079 
(.081)
.13* 
(.058)
 iZone Cohort 4 −.048 
(.056)
−.086 
(.053)
−.029 
(.08)
−.034 
(.081)
 iZone Cohort 5 −.19** 
(.065)
−.26*** 
(.03)
−.29* 
(.13)
.075 
(.12)
 Prior-year lag .62*** 
(.0043)
.67*** 
(.0041)
.57*** 
(.0082)
.61*** 
(.005)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116
Observations 315,663 114,299 105,023 96,341
Adjusted R2 .417 .479 .371 .404
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 
priority list. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks
To test the robustness of our DID estimates, we first use 
an alternative specification where we model the preturn-
around trend using a comparative interrupted time series 
(CITS) model that includes a linear time trend interacted 
with ASD and iZone indicators (Appendix Table A9). The 
CITS results yield conclusions that are similar to our DID 
estimates. For example, the CITS model finds that, relative 
to comparison schools, the postturnaround deviation from 
the baseline trend for iZone schools is 0.11 SD. We do not 
use the CITS models as our main specification, because it 
estimates deviations from the baseline (preturnaround) 
trend, and the baseline trend may not be an accurate repre-
sentation of how these schools are performing after 6 years 
of reform when student achievement trends in these schools 
may have changed dramatically.
Next, we examine potential validity threats. First, we test 
whether results are driven by a dip in performance among turn-
around schools in the year immediately prior to reforms. This 
preturnaround dip may inflate our results because of mean 
reversion (Ashenfelter, 1978) and could occur if schools are 
discouraged by impending reforms in the following year. We 
examine this possibility using a placebo test that shifts the 
treatment year to the year prior to reforms and find that the 
estimates are not significant, providing evidence that no dip in 
performance exists in the baseline year (Appendix Table A10).
Then, we test whether our results are driven by changes in 
the student population in ASD or iZone schools by using both 
a student fixed effect model and testing whether the turn-
around reforms significantly affected school compositional 
characteristics: enrollment and whether students are female, 
minority race, FRPM-eligible, ELL, and SpED. Effect esti-
mates from the student fixed effects model produce similar 
conclusions (Appendix Table A11), and we find no evidence 
of changes in student characteristics after schools join either 
the ASD or an iZone (Appendix Table A12). Next, we test 
whether our results are robust to our choice of comparison 
group by using nonpriority schools that perform among the 
lowest 6% to 10% of schools in Tennessee. Our conclusions 
do not change when using this alternative comparison group 
(Appendix Table A13). Additionally, we restrict our compari-
son group to only schools designated as priority in 2012, 
instead of using both the 2012 and 2014 priority lists. Again, 
our conclusions do not change (Appendix Table A3). We also 
test whether our results are driven by students differentially 
leaving the test taking pool, by examining ASD and iZone 
effects on an indicator for missing test scores. We find that 
neither turnaround model significantly affected test score 
missingness, providing confidence that our results are not 
biased by differential selection of students into the sample 
(Appendix Table A14).
Finally, student movement between schools may bias 
our results. The potential bias may be concerning if 
TABLE 6
ASD and iZone Effects on Test Scores and Alternative Outcomes Across All Years and Cohorts
Student level Teacher level Principal level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test 
scores
Attendance 
rate
Student 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Teacher 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Prior year 
TVAAS for 
incoming 
teachers
Teacher 
years of 
experience
Principal 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Principal 
observation 
score (1–5)
Principal 
years of 
experience
ASD .0022 
(.031)
−.011 
(.0057)
−.045 
(.027)
.23*** 
(.036)
−.2 
(.29)
−4.9*** 
(.67)
.47*** 
(.092)
.011 
(.11)
−3.4*** 
(.65)
iZone .096** 
(.035)
−.00098 
(.006)
−.011 
(.019)
.055 
(.029)
.049 
(.21)
−1.5** 
(.48)
.11 
(.097)
.1 
(.11)
−1.1 
(.69)
Individual and 
school covariates
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315,663 272,112 272,202 26,573 1,259 26,281 753 667 753
Adjusted R2 .416 .013 .014 .018 .011 .073 .056 .034 .100
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 
priority list. LPM denotes linear probability models for a dichotomous outcome. Student new to school does not include structural moves where students 
transfer to a new school level after completing the final grade offered at her previous school. The TVAAS index is a standardized, continuous value-added 
measure of effectiveness calculated only for test subject teachers. Principal observation scores range from 1 (significantly below expectations) to 5 (signifi-
cantly above expectations). ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zones; TVAAS = Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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TABLE 7
ASD and iZone Effects on Test Scores and Alternative Outcomes By Cohort
Student Level Teacher Level Principal Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Test 
scores
Attendance 
rate
Student 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Teacher 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Prior year 
TVAAS for 
incoming 
teachers
Teacher 
years  
of 
experience
Principal 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Principal 
observation 
score (1–5)
Principal 
years of 
experience
ASD
 ASD Cohort 1 .043 
(.052)
−.014 
(.0079)
−.093 
(.066)
.22*** 
(.033)
−.13 
(.38)
−5.9*** 
(.46)
.7*** 
(.11)
−.23 
(.16)
−2.5*** 
(.67)
 ASD Cohort 2 −.082* 
(.041)
−.0031 
(.0062)
−.052 
(.04)
.23*** 
(.056)
−.59 
(.5)
−7.2*** 
(.72)
.36* 
(.16)
−.0032 
(.16)
−4** 
(1.4)
 ASD Cohort 3 .0058 
(.046)
−.014 
(.0087)
−.065** 
(.02)
.2*** 
(.035)
.027 
(.22)
−5.2*** 
(.5)
.38* 
(.16)
.19 
(.2)
−2* 
(.97)
 ASD Cohort 4 .055 
(.045)
−.005 
(.0099)
.015 
(.022)
.16 
(.089)
−.62* 
(.31)
−4.1** 
(1.3)
.45*** 
(.088)
.25 
(.24)
−4.6*** 
(1)
 ASD Cohort 5 −.04 
(.065)
−.027* 
(.012)
.031 
(.032)
.38*** 
(.043)
−.61* 
(.29)
−2.3* 
(1.1)
.46** 
(.15)
−.2 
(.22)
−4.1*** 
(.94)
iZone
 iZone Cohort 1 .16*** 
(.046)
−.0058 
(.0062)
.00093 
(.031)
.032 
(.048)
.27 
(.29)
−1.6 
(.87)
−.048 
(.14)
.45* 
(.18)
−1.5 
(1.1)
 iZone Cohort 2 .15** 
(.055)
.015 
(.0096)
−.02 
(.027)
.079* 
(.036)
.073 
(.22)
−2*** 
(.56)
.046 
(.13)
−.0036 
(.13)
1 
(.99)
 iZone Cohort 3 −.0021 
(.033)
−.02 
(.012)
−.024 
(.025)
.093* 
(.04)
−.35 
(.29)
−1.9*** 
(.52)
.52 
(.35)
.059 
(.25)
−2.6 
(1.7)
 iZone Cohort 4 −.048 
(.056)
−.0048 
(.0051)
−.02 
(.022)
.0096 
(.06)
.25 
(.25)
−.78 
(.8)
.16 
(.14)
.038 
(.16)
−2.1 
(1)
 Zone Cohort 5 −.19** 
(.065)
.014 
(.012)
.03 
(.024)
.15** 
(.045)
−.6** 
(.21)
−.49 
(.84)
.55* 
(.21)
−.33 
(.41)
−4.1* 
(2)
Individual and 
school covariates
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315,663 272,112 272,202 26,573 1,259 26,281 753 667 753
Adjusted R2 .417 .014 .015 .019 .015 .074 .064 .046 .125
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. LPM denotes linear probability models for a dichotomous outcome. Student new to school does not include structural 
moves. The TVAAS index is a standardized, continuous value-added measure of effectiveness calculated only for test subject teachers. Principal observation 
scores range from 1 (significantly below expectations) to 5 (significantly above expectations). ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation 
Zone; TVAAS = Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
schools retain higher-scoring students and push out lower-
scoring students (Zimmer & Guarino, 2013). This issue is 
unlikely, because ASD and iZone schools were required 
to continue enrolling students from their neighborhood 
catchment areas. Nevertheless, we examine average stu-
dent test scores among students who transfer into and out 
of schools in our sample (Appendix Table A15). We find 
no evidence of significant differences between incoming 
and outgoing students.19
Student movement could also bias results if they move 
between turnaround and nonturnaround schools. For 
example, if students move from a turnaround school to a 
comparison school, the turnaround effects may linger after 
they transfer. To examine this issue, we remove all obser-
vations where students move (1) from a turnaround to a 
comparison school, (2) from a comparison to a turnaround 
school, or (3) across the two turnaround models. Only 
about 4% of the students in our sample make these 
Pham et al.
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transfers. These sample restrictions yield results that are 
similar to our main estimates (Appendix Table A16). 
Together, results from our checks support the robustness 
of our results.
Conclusions
This article examines the effects of Tennessee’s ASD and 
iZones after 6 years, contributing to the sparse literature on 
turnaround reforms that have evolved beyond the initial dis-
ruption stage into the later stages of capacity-building and 
sustaining the momentum. We use newly updated data to 
expand on a prior evaluation by Zimmer et al. (2017), 
because the effects reported by Zimmer and colleagues may 
have not allowed enough time for either model to fully 
mature, nor did they allow sufficient time to examine the 
sustainability of iZone effects. We find that ASD interven-
tions did not result in better or worse performance than com-
parison schools, whereas positive iZone effects are primarily 
observed in the first two cohorts.
Since ASD schools have not produced significant effects 
on student achievement in any subject, year, or cohort, we 
conclude that the ASD model is unlikely to be successful in 
the future. Researchers have documented structural prob-
lems with this original model including alienation of local 
communities around these schools (Glazer & Egan, 2018), 
and TDOE leaders have recently announced plans to release 
ASD schools back to their LEAs by 2022 (Bauman & 
Aldrich, 2020).
To help explain null ASD effects, we find high rates of 
teacher and principal turnover in ASD schools after Year 1 
when staff replacement was no longer required. Organizational 
instability from high staff turnover may partly explain why 
ASD schools could not produce positive effects. This result 
aligns with prior literature which finds that high staff turnover 
is negatively associated with student achievement (Henry & 
Redding, 2020; Ronfeldt et al., 2013) and a prior study finding 
that staff turnover suppresses potential positive effects of 
school reform (Henry et al., 2020). Our results also suggest 
that the characteristics of teachers and principals recruited to 
ASD schools may help explain insignificant effects. Teachers 
recruited to ASD schools were less effective and less experi-
enced than teachers in comparison schools. Moreover, ASD 
principals have about 3.4 fewer years of experience than prin-
cipals in comparison schools. Moving forward under ESSA, 
these results highlight the importance of experienced and 
effective educators on the success of school reform.
The iZone schools may have more easily recruited 
effective educators partly because they offered pay 
bonuses. Previous studies have shown that pay incentives 
can have a positive effect on teacher recruitment (Springer 
et al., 2016), suggesting that pay incentives can be a useful 
tool for policymakers to consider in order to bring effec-
tive educators into turnaround schools. Moreover, ASD 
schools may have had difficulty recruiting educators 
because the state-led model failed to gain trust from local 
communities. Previous work showed that the ASD faced 
community backlash when it began operating schools 
because critics saw the model as an attempt to remove 
schools from their local community (Glazer & Egan, 
2018). Community mistrust may have dissuaded educators 
from coming to ASD schools, which suggests that policy-
makers thinking about state-led turnaround models must 
carefully attend to building local support.
For iZone schools, we find that positive effects are largely 
driven by the first two cohorts. Indeed, our effect estimates, 
averaging all cohorts together, are smaller than those reported 
by Zimmer et al. (2017). We estimate effect sizes (in SD) of 
0.06 in reading, 0.10 in math, and 0.15 in science, whereas 
Zimmer et al. (2017) report effect sizes of 0.10 in reading, 
0.20 in math, and 0.18 in science. The diminished effects in 
later cohorts suggest that the iZones may be having difficulty 
sustaining initial positive results.
To better understand effects in later iZone cohorts, we 
compare characteristics of students in each cohort and find 
them to be similar, suggesting that diminished effects in later 
cohorts are not driven by different types of schools joining 
the iZones. However, one potential reason for the dimin-
ished effects may be the inclusion of high schools. The 
iZones began taking over high schools starting with the third 
cohort, and the fifth iZone cohort consists entirely of high 
schools. This timing suggests that iZone interventions may 
be less effective in high schools. We test this potential expla-
nation by interacting a high school indicator with the ASD 
and iZone indicators and find that this is indeed the case 
(Appendix Table A17). We urge future research to examine 
specific iZone interventions to better understand why they 
have not been as effective in high schools.
The negative effect of iZone schools in the fifth cohort is 
also noticeable, and our examination of teacher and principal 
outcomes suggest potential reasons to explain these negative 
effects. Relative to earlier cohorts, cohort five schools experi-
enced the highest turnover rates, and educators in cohort five 
schools were less effective and less experienced prior to join-
ing the iZone. These trends differ markedly from the first 
iZone cohort where teachers and principals were more effec-
tive than their counterparts in comparison schools. Comparing 
educator effectiveness and turnover across cohorts suggests 
that the local pool of effective educators may have diminished 
as more schools joined the iZone. This may have left too few 
effective educators available to staff schools in later cohorts, 
leading to less positive student achievement results.
Our findings have important implications for longer-term 
reform models under ESSA. Policymakers considering turn-
around initiatives that rely on recruiting effective staff to 
low-performing schools would do well to focus on ways to 
continue expanding the local pool of effective teachers and 
leaders, perhaps by recruiting from broader geographic areas 
Sustainability and Maturation of School Turnaround
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or building more robust in-service professional development 
programs. Developing more effective teachers is especially 
important given previous research finding that recruiting 
effective teachers to iZone schools negatively affected the 
schools that lost these teachers (Kho et al., 2018). To sustain 
turnaround supports for low-performing schools without 
negatively affecting other schools, educational authorities 
should pay particular attention to developing teachers and 
principals in low-performing schools.
In both turnaround models, we find no notable effects on 
student mobility or attendance. Student mobility is a salient 
issue in both ASD and iZone schools, because the proportion 
of students making nonstructural moves into these schools 
(30%) is approximately double the rates in nonpriority 
schools (15%). Given research that finds that school mobility 
can negatively affect student achievement (Friedman-Krauss 
& Raver, 2015), reform initiatives like the ASD and iZones 
should consider more actively addressing high-student 
mobility rates. Although average student attendance rates in 
ASD and iZone schools are only somewhat lower than in 
nonpriority schools (92% vs. 95%), low-student attendance 
rates can be a barrier to improvement if students are not in 
class to receive instruction. Future research should specifi-
cally examine how school reform models improve outcomes 
for chronically absent students, because they will likely need 
the most attendance support.
Overall, our results show a need for more evidence to elu-
cidate school reforms in the later stages of capacity-building 
and sustaining the momentum. Even models that produce 
positive gains in early years may face different obstacles that 
require an evolving approach to supporting low-performing 
schools over time. We urge policymakers and educational 
authorities to carefully consider these lessons from Tennessee 
as they implement new reform models under ESSA.
Appendix
TABLE A1
Results After Restricting to Only Priority Schools in Memphis
(1) (2) (3)
 Reading Math Science
ASD .030 
(.028)
.009 
(.042)
.014 
(.042)
iZone .087* 
(.034)
.140** 
(.047)
.229*** 
(.044)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 86 86 86
Observations 1,68,907 1,51,245 1,41,303
Adjusted R2 .433 .370 .358
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = state-led Achievement School District; iZone = district-led local Innovation Zones.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE A2
Comparisons of the Two Treatment Groups (ASD and iZone) and the Comparison Group (All Other Priority Schools)
ASD iZone
 Non-ASD non-iZone priority Ever treated Non-ASD non-izone priority Ever treated
Student test scores
 Average reading score −0.943 −1 −0.943 −0.988
 Average math score −0.944 −0.92 −0.944 −0.938
 Average science score −1.1 −1.15 −1.1 −1.14
Student characteristics
 Proportion female .488 .493 .488 .486
 Proportion minority .988 .985 .988 .967*
 Proportion FRPM .881 .886 .881 .921
 Proportion SpED .15 .153 .15 .172
 Proportion ELL .0261 .0166 .0261 .0208
Note. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone; FRPM = eligibility for free or reduced priced meals; ELL = English language 
learner; SpED = special education status.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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TABLE A3
Results Using Only Schools on the 2012 Priority List
(1) (2) (3)
 Reading Math Science
ASD .031 
(.029)
.004 
(.042)
−.020 
(.039)
iZone .067* 
(.029)
.118** 
(.042)
.125** 
(.042)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 83 83 83
Observations 166,410 152,425 143,929
Adjusted R2 .439 .381 .366
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE A4
ASD and iZones Effects on All Outcomes: No Covariates
Student Level Teacher Level Principal Level
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
 
Test 
scores
Test 
scores—no 
grade fixed 
effect
Attendance 
rate
Student 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Teacher 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Prior year 
TVAAS index 
for incoming 
teachers
Teacher 
years of 
experience
Principal 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Principal 
observation 
score (1–5)
Principal 
years of 
experience
ASD −.021 
(.03)
−.02 
(.03)
−.008 
(.0058)
−.049 
(.029)
.26*** 
(.038)
−.21 
(.27)
−6*** 
(.75)
.46*** 
(.083)
.012 
(.11)
−3.5*** 
(.64)
iZone .079* 
(.036)
.076* 
(.037)
−.00042 
(.006)
−.015 
(.02)
.048 
(.029)
.02 
(.21)
−1.6** 
(.53)
.071 
(.093)
.12 
(.11)
−.97 
(.7)
Individual and 
school covariates
No No No No No No No No No No
Grade fixed effect Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315,886 316,064 272,571 272,661 27,268 1,274 26,966 779 693 779
Adjusted R2 .405 .403 004 0.000 .013 .006 .021 .054 .001 .093
Note. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 priority list. LPM denotes 
linear probability models for a dichotomous outcome. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone; TVAAS = Tennessee Value-Added 
Assessment System.
*p < .05. **p < .01. *** p < .001.
TABLE A5
ASD and iZones Effects on Test Scores Averaged Across All Years and Cohorts Using Various Lags
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 No lag School-by-grade baseline lag Student baseline lag Prior year lag
ASD .01 
(.04)
.00 
(.04)
.03 
(.04)
.00 
(.03)
iZone .14** 
(.05)
.13** 
(.05)
.14** 
(.04)
.10** 
(.03)
(continued)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
 No lag School-by-grade baseline lag Student baseline lag Prior year lag
School-by-grade baseline lag .41*** 
(.04)
 
Student level baseline lag .83*** 
(.01)
 
Prior year lag .62*** 
(.00)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116
Observations 467,407 455,209 329,249 315,663
Adjusted R2 .107 .110 .527 .416
Note. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 priority list. ASD = Achieve-
ment School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE A5 (CONTINUED)
TABLE A6
Descriptive Characteristics by Cohort in the Postturnaround Period
ASD iZone
 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5 Cohort 1 Cohort 2 Cohort 3 Cohort 4 Cohort 5
Student characteristics
 Female .48 .5 .49 .46 .47 .48 .49 .49 .43 .47
 Black .94 .97 .96 .85 .93 .99 .81 .98 .98 .97
 Hispanic .026 .015 .03 .09 .06 .0083 .16 .011 .0042 .03
 Asian .0037 0 .0034 .011 .00092 .00012 .0086 .00034 0 .0005
 White .024 .01 .0078 .052 .0069 .0041 .022 .0038 .013 .0025
 FRPM .9 .9 .79 .73 .7 .93 .89 .92 .92 .88
 ELL .021 .01 .021 .01 .045 .0035 .099 .0033 .0042 .014
 SpED .15 .13 .14 .12 .15 .14 .12 .19 .1 .18
 Attendance rate .93 .92 .91 .94 .91 .94 .94 .89 .93 .91
 Proportion new to school .3 .34 .29 .31 .38 .36 .32 .33 .38 .23
Teacher characteristics
 Female .82 .84 .75 .85 .8 .82 .8 .65 .82 .62
 Black .61 .58 .52 .51 .72 .8 .73 .76 .73 .81
 White .38 .37 .46 .47 .27 .19 .25 .22 .27 .17
 Proportion New to school .53 .46 .45 .52 .64 .36 .35 .4 .43 .36
 TVAAS score (1–5) 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 3.4 3.5 2.8 2.8 3
 Years of experience 5.1 3.7 5.6 6 6 9.9 9.1 9.1 8.7 11
 Master’s degree or higher .55 .6 .49 .63 .51 .7 .68 .61 .5 .62
Principal characteristics
 Female .88 .88 .43 .91 .88 .67 .52 .43 1 .5
 Black .64 .79 .57 .55 .75 .95 .97 .88 1 1
 White .36 .21 .43 .45 .25 .05 .034 .13 0 0
 Proportion new to school .79 .56 .67 .73 .63 .3 .47 .81 .33 .33
 Years of experience 1.9 1.8 2.9 2.4 1.4 4.4 5.5 3.4 11 4.8
 Master’s degree or higher .83 .8 .47 .91 .75 1 1 1 1 1
Note. Attendance rate is the proportion of school days attended. The proportion of students new to a school do not include students who make structural 
moves. Principal years of experience only includes the years in which the individual was a principal not all years of experience as an educator. The teacher 
TVAAS and principal observation scores range from 1 (significantly below expectations) to 5 (significantly above expectations). ASD = Achievement 
School District; iZone = Innovation Zone; FRPM = eligibility for free or reduced priced meals; ELL = English language learner; SpED = special education 
status; TVAAS = Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System.
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TABLE A7
Student Achievement Effects in Each Pre- and Postturnaround Year Relative to the Baseline Year Before Turnaround (Year 0)
(1) (2) (3)
 Reading Math Science
ASD Year −5 −.032 
(.030)
−.049 
(.056)
−.025 
(.041)
ASD Year −4 −.026 
(.035)
−.040 
(.041)
−.044 
(.051)
ASD Year −3 −.045 
(.026)
−.035 
(.036)
−.016 
(.050)
ASD Year −2 .004 
(.035)
−.048 
(.036)
.031 
(.042)
ASD Year −1 .045 
(.030)
.012 
(.050)
.048 
(.056)
ASD Year 1 −.000 
(.046)
−.051 
(.110)
−.035 
(.113)
ASD Year 2 .036 
(.039)
.081 
(.063)
.016 
(.068)
ASD Year 3 .092** 
(.033)
.059 
(.078)
.126 
(.076)
ASD Year 4 .039 
(.051)
−.052 
(.074)
−.007 
(.093)
ASD Year 5 −.021 
(.036)
−.099 
(0.076)
.033 
(.196)
ASD Year 6 −.019 
(.081)
−.174* 
(.086)
−.087 
(.131)
iZone Year −5 .049 
(.031)
.099 
(.053)
.090 
(.052)
iZone Year −4 .019 
(.025)
.011 
(.045)
.025 
(.030)
iZone Year −3 .006 
(.024)
.027 
(.040)
.015 
(.027)
iZone Year −2 −.014 
(.020)
−.040 
(.031)
−.016 
(.028)
iZone Year −1 .001 
(.023)
.058 
(.039)
.002 
(.027)
iZone Year 1 .025 
(.033)
.183*** 
(.053)
.141* 
(.059)
iZone Year 2 .083* 
(.035)
.171** 
(.056)
.214*** 
(.057)
iZone Year 3 .064 
(.038)
.093 
(.057)
.139** 
(.053)
iZone Year 4 −.046 
(.082)
−.066 
(.121)
.232* 
(.096)
iZone Year 5 .103* 
(.041)
.068 
(.057)
.112** 
(.041)
iZone Year 6 .135** 
(.042)
.086 
(.079)
.063 
(.100)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116
Observations 219,618 199,161 187,318
Adjusted R2 .442 .383 .370
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. Year 0 is the reference year. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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TABLE A8
ASD and iZone Effects on Test Scores and Alternative Outcomes by Year
Student level Teacher level Principal level
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
 
Test 
Scores
Attendance 
rate
Student 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Teacher 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
TVAAS 
index for all 
incoming 
teachers
Teacher 
years of 
experience
Principal 
new to 
school 
(LPM)
Principal 
observation 
score (1–5)
Principal 
years of 
experience
ASD
 ASD Year 1 −0.037 
(0.064)
−0.018* 
(0.0074)
0.0051 
(0.02)
0.48*** 
(0.074)
−0.084 
(0.34)
−4.3*** 
(0.72)
0.73*** 
(0.12)
−0.058 
(0.19)
−3.1** 
(1)
 ASD Year 2 0.023 
(0.056)
−0.0048 
(0.0078)
−0.026 
(0.028)
0.099* 
(0.046)
0.24 
(0.26)
−5.7*** 
(0.76)
0.53*** 
(0.13)
0.4* 
(0.17)
−4.5*** 
(0.79)
 ASD Year 3 0.017 
(0.051)
−0.0036 
(0.0074)
−0.063* 
(0.026)
0.089 
(0.057)
−0.47 
(0.41)
−5.6*** 
(0.59)
0.08 
(0.17)
0.1 
(0.15)
−3.6*** 
(1)
 ASD Year 4 −0.056 
(0.055)
−0.022* 
(0.009)
−0.09** 
(0.032)
0.14* 
(0.057)
−0.84* 
(0.41)
−5.4*** 
(0.67)
0.099 
(0.19)
0.037 
(0.17)
−1.8 
(1.5)
 ASD Year 5 −0.04 
(0.092)
−0.018 
(0.0099)
−0.13** 
(0.039)
.073 
(.068)
−0.87* 
(0.41)
−4.5*** 
(0.67)
0.98*** 
(0.16)
0.13 
(0.13)
−2.9* 
(1.4)
 ASD Year 6 −0.084 
(0.1)
−0.01 
(0.0077)
−0.11* 
(0.042)
0.046 
(0.083)
−1.1* 
(0.48)
−4*** 
(1.1)
0.45* 
(0.23)
0.2 
(0.17)
−2.4 
(1.3)
iZone
 iZone Year 1 0.11* 
(0.042)
−0.003 
(0.0066)
−0.027 
(0.02)
0.23*** 
(0.044)
0.38 
(0.31)
−1.8*** 
(0.38)
0.22 
(0.14)
−0.089 
(0.15)
−1.2 
(0.73)
 iZone Year 2 0.15** 
(0.044)
0.0013 
(0.0066)
−0.00066 
(0.021)
0.014 
(0.036)
−0.089 
(0.21)
−1.8*** 
(0.45)
0.056 
(0.14)
0.46*** 
(0.12)
−0.56 
(0.86)
 iZone Year 3 0.027 
(0.045)
−0.0035 
(0.0078)
0.016 
(0.024)
−0.032 
(0.039)
0.2 
(0.31)
−1.3* 
(0.52)
0.051 
(0.13)
0.2 
(0.16)
−1.4 
(0.86)
 iZone Year 4 −0.059 
(0.1)
0.006 
(0.0095)
−0.024 
(0.025)
0.015 
(0.043)
−0.11 
(0.25)
−1.8** 
(0.61)
0.34* 
(0.15)
−0.23 
(0.17)
−1.9 
(1)
 iZone Year 5 0.11 
(0.07)
0.002 
(0.0076)
−0.062 
(0.035)
−0.055 
(0.04)
−.1 
(0.31)
−1.5* 
(0.71)
−0.078 
(0.16)
−0.23 
(0.19)
−1 
(1.1)
 iZone Year 6 0.14* 
(0.067)
−0.012 
(0.0083)
0.0073 
(0.033)
−0.077 
(.053)
−0.51 
(0.39)
−1.4 
(0.86)
−0.23 
(0.2)
.19 
(0.2)
0.16 
(1.4)
Individual and 
school covariates
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315,663 272,112 272,202 26,573 1,259 26,281 753 667 753
Adjusted R2 .417 .015 .017 .036 .024 .074 .072 .117 .096
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. LPM denotes linear probability models for a dichotomous outcome. Student new to school does not include structural 
moves. The TVAAS index is a standardized, continuous value-added measure of effectiveness calculated only for test subject teachers. Principal observation 
scores range from 1 (significantly below expectations) to 5 (significantly above expectations). ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation 
Zone; TVAAS = Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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TABLE A9
Effects of ASD and iZone Interventions on Student Test Scores Using a Comparative Interrupted Time Series Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 All subjects Reading Math Science
Ever ASD * After treatment −048 
(.045)
−.028 
(.040)
−.060 
(.064)
−.056 
(.068)
Ever iZone * After treatment .107* 
(.046)
.044 
(.040)
.128* 
(.052)
.171* 
(.069)
Linear time trend −.020*** 
(.006)
−.014* 
(.006)
−.026*** 
(.007)
−.019* 
(.008)
Ever ASD * Linear time trend .017* 
(.008)
.015 
(.008)
.017 
(.009)
.018 
(.011)
Ever iZone * Linear time trend −.000 
(.007)
.004 
(.007)
−.003 
(.008)
−.005 
(.010)
Prior year lag .604*** 
(.004)
.633*** 
(.004)
.589*** 
(.007)
.577*** 
(.006)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116
Observations 606,097 219,618 199,161 187,318
Adjusted R2 .401 .442 .383 .370
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. The linear time trend is centered such that Year 0 is the year prior to schools entering either the ASD or an iZone. ASD 
and iZone represent the interaction between indicators for schools that are ever ASD or ever iZone and an indicator for years after schools begin turnaround. 
Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 priority list. ASD = Achievement 
School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE A10
Placebo Test for Prior Year Dip in Performance by Centering Treatment on the Year Before Turnaround
(1) (2) (3)
 Reading Math Science
ASD −.012 
(.026)
−.010 
(.049)
−.020 
(.058)
iZone .003 
(.032)
.100 
(.051)
.061 
(.045)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116
Observations 114,299 102,674 94,446
Adjusted R2 .477 .407 .450
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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TABLE A11
Student Fixed Effect Model
(1) (2) (3)
 Reading Math Science
ASD .034 
(.018)
.021 
(.022)
.017 
(.022)
iZone .096*** 
(.013)
.189*** 
(.015)
.124*** 
(.016)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes
Student fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116
Observations 1,14,299 1,05,023 96,341
Adjusted R Squared 0.045 0.062 .081
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE A12
Total Enrollment and Student Characteristics as Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Total enrollment Female Minority FRPM ELL SpED
ASD −41.218 
(33.383)
−0.020 
(0.011)
−0.000 
(0.002)
0.005 
(0.007)
0.008 
(0.005)
0.002 
(0.013)
iZone 11.899 
(23.308)
−0.006 
(0.009)
0.002 
(0.002)
−0.001 
(0.005)
0.003 
(0.005)
0.012 
(0.009)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116 116 116
Observations 91,647 91,647 91,659 91,647 91,647 172,683
Adjusted R2 .076 .045 .015 .130 .269 .025
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone; FRPM = eligibility for free reduced-price meals; ELL 
= English language learner; SpED = special education status.
*p < .05 **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
TABLE A13
Alternative Comparison Group of Lowest Performing 6% to 10% of Schools
(1) (2) (3)
 Reading Math Science
ASD .016 
(.027)
.033 
(.036)
.019 
(.031)
iZone .055* 
(.025)
.129*** 
(.037)
.143*** 
(.037)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 158 158 157
Observations 180,432 169,416 155,244
Adjusted R2 .519 .413 .448
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. The average student achievement score is a calculated measure of average achievement scores from all students and all 
subjects in each school. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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TABLE A14
ASD and iZones Effects on Test Score Missingness Across All Years and Cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 All Subjects Reading Math Science
ASD .02 
(.01)
.00 
(.00)
.02 
(.02)
.04 
(.03)
iZone .01 
(.01)
.00 
(.00)
.00 
(.00)
.04 
(.02)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 110 110 110 110
Observations 390,171 130,057 130,057 130,057
Adjusted R2 .052 .016 .009 .114
Note. Comparison group schools are all priority schools not receiving any turnaround interventions on either the 2012 or 2014 priority list. ASD = Achieve-
ment School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05 **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
TABLE A15
Standardized Test Scores for Transferring Students by Turnaround Year
ASD iZone Non-ASD, non-iZone Priority
 Transfer in
Transfer 
out
p value of 
difference Transfer in
Transfer 
out
p value of 
difference Transfer in
Transfer 
out
p value of 
difference
Year 1
 Reading −1.02 −1.00 .87 −0.90 −0.93 .63 −0.92 −0.93 .97
 Math −1.02 −0.87 .07 −0.69 −0.70 .86 −0.84 −0.78 .22
 Science −1.16 −1.12 .68 −0.92 −0.97 .56 −0.98 −0.99 .84
Year 2
 Reading −0.94 −1.01 .38 −0.80 −0.82 .76 −0.85 −0.87 .66
 Math −0.76 −0.86 .38 −0.69 −0.68 .85 −0.79 −0.79 .91
 Science −1.01 −1.12 .41 −0.78 −0.81 .75 −0.90 −0.91 .81
Year 3
 Reading −0.93 −0.84 .45 −0.80 −0.90 .17 −0.79 −0.87 .13
 Math −0.87 −0.78 .31 −0.72 −0.82 .25 −0.71 −0.82 .07
 Science −0.88 −0.91 .80 −0.83 −0.86 .73 −0.82 −0.93 .07
Year 4
 Reading −0.77 −0.74 .86 −0.88 −0.93 .67 −0.85 −0.86 .90
 Math −0.80 −0.82 .86 −0.87 −0.91 .75 −0.86 −0.87 .89
 Science −0.86 −0.93 .65 −0.88 −0.83 .68 −0.88 −0.83 .59
Year 5
 Reading −0.91 −0.77 .19 −0.90 −0.92 .83 −0.84 −0.84 .97
 Math −0.91 −0.83 .50 −0.85 −0.84 .90 −0.81 −0.80 .82
 Science −1.00 −0.96 .84 −0.89 −0.80 .52 −0.86 −0.86 .96
Note. Year 6 could not be calculated because transfer out cannot be observed for the final year. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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TABLE A16
Remove Observations Where Student Move Between Turnaround and Comparison Schools
Dropped movers from turnaround to 
nonturnaround schools
Dropped any movers from or to turnaround 
schools or between turnaround schools
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Reading Math Science Reading Math Science
ASD .010 
(.032)
−.013 
(.045)
.008 
(.043)
.013 
(.032)
−.010 
(.045)
.007 
(.043)
iZone .054 
(.029)
.092* 
(.042)
.146** 
(.047)
.051 
(.029)
.093* 
(.042)
.144** 
(.047)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116 116 116
Observations 111,836 102,711 94,629 110,188 101,131 93,294
Adjusted R2 .480 .370 .403 .481 .370 .403
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE A17
Interactions With an Indicator for High Schools
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 All subjects Reading Math Science
ASD .01 
(.03)
.00 
(.03)
−.02 
(.05)
.03 
(.04)
ASD * High school −.01 
(.03)
.02 
(0.06)
.11* 
(0.04)
−.11 
(.13)
iZone .13*** 
(.04)
.09** 
(.03)
.14*** 
(.04)
.16** 
(.05)
iZone * High school −.20*** 
(.04)
−.16*** 
(0.04)
−.26*** 
(0.07)
−.06 
(.06)
Prior year lag .62*** 
(.00)
.67*** 
(.00)
.57*** 
(.01)
.61*** 
(.00)
Student and school covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
School fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of schools 116 116 116 116
Observations 3,15,663 1,14,299 1,05,023 96,341
Adjusted R2 .417 .478 .370 .403
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. ASD = Achievement School District; iZone = Innovation Zone.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Notes
1. Comparing the longer term effects of school turnaround with 
earlier school improvement initiatives like comprehensive school 
improvement also allows us to better assess models that explic-
itly focus on rapid change (i.e., turnaround) relative to models 
that require longer term implementation (i.e., school improve-
ment). Also, some studies of turnaround find larger effects in math 
than in English Language Arts (ELA) in the early years of reform 
(Schueler et al., 2017), suggesting that gains may take longer to 
develop in some subjects.
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2. Two other school reform models that have lasted beyond the 
first 3 years include the reforms in New Orleans (Harris & Larsen, 
2019) and in Newark (Chin et al., 2019).
3. We find no significant differences between CMO-run and 
direct-run ASD schools. Results separating direct-run and CMO-
run ASD schools are available on request.
4.  Examining longer term effects on both models will help shed 
light on central office leadership as part of sustainable reforms. 
For the ASD, removing schools from their LEA could mean that 
reforms are shielded from changing district mandates; however, 
iZones could also support sustainability by building LEA capacity 
while schools are undergoing reform. Moreover, keeping schools 
within their LEA could support sustainable reforms because 
schools will not have to transition between state-led and district-led 
governance. No schools in Tennessee’s ASD have transitioned back 
to their LEAs, but comparing the two models over time helps shed 
light on sustainable reforms at the district level.
5.  See Appendix Table A1.
6.  Our conclusions do not change when we completely exclude 
any schools that will eventually close.
7.  See Appendix Table A2 and Figure 1.
8.  Of the 83 priority schools on 2012 list, 69 are located in 
Memphis, and 50 of the 83 schools the 2014 list are located in 
Memphis. Restricting our analysis to only Memphis-area schools 
do not change our substantive conclusions. See Appendix 
Table A1.
9. The total number of schools on the 2014 priority list was 
85 but two were schools that split off from existing ASD schools. 
Our analysis considers these split-off schools as part of the origi-
nal school. While both the ASD and iZones operated new-start 
schools that did not exist previously, they were not priority schools 
when they opened, were usually the result of CMOs opening new 
schools independent of ASD operations, and are not included in 
our analysis.
10. We test the sensitivity of our results to an alternative sample 
where we include the end-of-course scores in high school subjects 
from 2015 to 2016, resulting in very minor changes. Much of this is 
because both the ASD and iZones operated very few high schools 
in 2015–2016, so including these scores add little to our analysis.
11. Nonstructural moves do not include transfers where students 
move to a different school level after completing the final grade 
offered at their previous school (e.g., moving to a high school after 
completing the final grade in a middle school).
12. For a complete list of all domains and indicators on the TILS 
rubric, see Grissom et al. (2018).
13. The model does not include separate indicators for schools 
that are ever ASD or an indicator for schools that are ever iZone 
schools, because the school fixed effect is perfectly collinear with 
these indicators.
14. We control for student race because of the rich literature 
showing that racial stereotypes can influence the effect of school 
interventions on student achievement (Cohen et al., 2006). We 
control for gender because gender has been shown to be correlated 
with differential test scores (Legewie & DiPrete, 2012). Likewise, 
we control for FRPM, ELL, and SpED because existing literature 
finds that social economic status (Chen & Weikart, 2008), English 
proficiency (Fry, 2008), and eligibility for special education ser-
vices (Hibel et al., 2010) all have an effect on both the likelihood 
that students attend low-performing schools and directly on their 
achievement.
15. We control for teacher and principal individual characteris-
tics, because they have all been shown to affect teachers’ and prin-
cipals’ decisions to either leave the profession or transfer schools, 
their effectiveness, and the likelihood that they will choose to work 
in a low-performing school (Borman & Dowling, 2008; Grissom, 
2011; Guarino et al., 2006; Ingersoll & Conner, 2009).
16. We also test models that include a number of different 
school covariates such as total enrollment, but none produced sub-
stantively differing results.
17. Separating the After variable into sets of year and cohort 
indicators are especially important alternative models in light 
of recent evidence from Goodman-Bacon (2018) who provides 
new evidence on DID models averaging across multiple treat-
ment times. Since our overall DID estimates are a weighted aver-
age of all combinations of estimators comparing earlier and later 
treated schools, using earlier treated schools as a control after 
their treatment can introduce bias if treatment effects vary over 
time and changes in treatment effects over time are incorporated 
into the overall DID estimate. To examine this potential for bias, 
we follow Goodman-Bacon’s suggestion to examine event-study 
models with indicators for different treatment years and cohorts. 
Our event-study model estimates support the conclusions from 
our overall DID estimates but provide more nuanced estimates 
for different treatment times.
18. We also test for statistically significant changes to student 
characteristics after turnaround, as described in the section on falsi-
fication and robustness checks.
19. Three cases show marginally significant differences: ASD 
math scores in Year 1 and comparison schools’ math and science 
scores in Year 3, but even in these cases, the small substantive 
differences between test scores for incoming and outgoing stu-
dents suggest that schools are not strategically altering the student 
population.
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